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I. INTRODUCTION
Often overlooked until invoked, the dispute resolution provisions of an
acquisition agreement frequently mirror the terms of a lawyer’s last deal.
Yet such provisions—including purchase price adjustment clauses, the
terms of governing earn-out disputes, and the contract sections outlining
the indemnification claims process—often have long-term economic
ramifications on the buyers and sellers. In working with corporate lawyers
over the years, we have noted that corporate lawyers understand (and give
intense thought to) the leverage their clients have, what their clients hope
to accomplish in a transaction, and what makes long-term economic sense
in drafting an agreement and negotiating more advantageous deal terms.
In this article, we hope to bring the same analytical intensity to dispute
resolution provisions.
While every deal is different and perspectives will vary between buy-
ers’ and sellers’ counsel, we have attempted to inform practitioners of the
issues that can arise depending on how the parties design their dispute
resolution provisions. Accordingly, we have first set out our views on the
current transactional environment and its implications on deal leverage
and terms. Then, we have described each of the key deal provisions that
we believe fall under the broad rubric of “dispute resolution” provisions.
In particular, we have analyzed: (i) Purchase Price Adjustments; (ii) Earn-
outs; and (iii) Indemnity for Breach of Representations and Warranties.
Next, using examples from our own matters and published cases, we
have set out many of the potential disputes that arise under each provi-
sion. Some of these issues are negotiated thoroughly in the first instance.
For example, should a purchase price adjustment provision call for the
consistent application of generally accepted accounting principles or sim-
ply the consistent application of the accounting principles typically em-
* Kenneth Mathieu is a licensed CPA in Illinois and Louisiana, and a managing
director with Mesirow Financial Consulting, LLC. Vincent P. (Trace) Schmeltz III is a
partner at Barnes & Thornburg LLP and co-chair of the firm’s Securities, Corporate
Governance and M&A Litigation Group.
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ployed by the target? Should an earn-out provision based on future
earnings make special arrangements for sellers who are no longer in con-
trol of the business? We attempt to provide sound advice regarding best
practices in acquisition agreements, however, the fact still remains: dis-
putes over purchase price adjustments, earn-outs, and representations and
warranties remain commonplace.
In an effort to help professionals craft provisions that streamline the
resolution of these potential disputes, we have analyzed the extent to
which such provisions are misunderstood or misapplied. For example,
standard provisions in acquisition agreements often call for the arbitration
of indemnification claims based on breaches of representations and war-
ranties. But, when such provisions call for both the expedited provisions of
the American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Rules and
the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it can lead to in-
consistent results. In other instances, parties choose the savings that result
from a single arbitrator without considering whether it would be helpful to
provide the arbitrator with a neutral expert or the perspective of two other
panelists, given that such proceedings are typically not appealable. Indeed,
lawyers often reflexively choose arbitration without considering how liti-
gation in court can be streamlined—whether through a trial by magistrate,
consent to limited discovery, or even application to a pre-trial court medi-
ation program, like that offered by the Delaware Court of Chancery.
Throughout this section, we have attempted to provide our own thoughts
and insight on how to bolster the standard dispute resolution clauses that
are prevalent in acquisition agreements.
Finally, we have included a case study that demonstrates, with hypo-
thetical facts, the perils of multiple dispute resolution provisions in an ac-
quisition agreement. As we conclude in our case study, separate provisions
can result in the same or similar issues being litigated at the same time, in
multiple forums, and may result in inequitable recoveries by one party
over the other. Accordingly, we recommend that parties consider a unified
dispute resolution procedure under which multiple disputes can be consol-
idated and single disputes handled efficiently.
II. CURRENT DEAL ENVIRONMENT
The last several years have seen the acquisition market spurt to life,
sputter, lose steam, and then slowly recover again. In 2011, private equity
deals were large and frequent in the first half of the year, but slowed down
considerably in the second half, purportedly due to “the sovereign debt
crisis, deficit reduction impasse and a growing concern about a slowing
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\1-1\MPE103.txt unknown Seq: 3 31-JUL-12 9:52
Spring 2012] Dispute Resolution — Acquisition Agreement 63
economy.”1 Ultimately, for the entire year, deal activity was basically flat,
although the total dollar-value of the transactions increased by 18%.2
In 2012, on the other hand, although experts were predicting more ro-
bust deal activity, actual results have not met expectations.3 Indeed, the
United States economy itself appears to be re-gaining steam, which ought
to bode well for the deal market in 2012. According to the Wall Street
Journal, the United States “economy grew at its fastest pace since the first-
half of 2010 during [the] final three months of last year,” although con-
sumer spending outpaced corporate spending.4 Public companies report
sitting on over $2 trillion in cash and the credit markets appear to be eas-
ing.5 Accordingly, Ernst & Young has concluded that “we expect to see
dealmaking pick-up in the first quarter of 2012.”6 Yet, by mid-year, law-
yers were reporting that deal value in 2012 is down forty percent over
2011.7
The deal environment will have an impact on the relative leverage par-
ties will have in negotiating transactional components. For instance, with
financing difficult to come by and buyers looking for bargains in tight eco-
nomic times, more buyers have insisted on so-called “earn-out” provisions
(described more fully below) in which a portion of the purchase price is
contingent upon future earnings. Sellers eager for a liquidity event in a
tough market have been forced to either accept such provisions or hold on
to their companies. Sellers with more options in the market will have more
leverage to avoid such provisions altogether. And, if financing becomes
less difficult to obtain, buyers may also be eager to avoid earn-outs, as
1. See, e.g., Ernst & Young Says Fundamentals Will Finally Prevail Over Uncertainty
to Get Deals Rolling in 2012 (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.ey.com/US/en/Newsroom/News-re-
leases/Ernst-and-Young-says-fundamentals-will-finally-prevail-over-uncertainty-to-get-deals-
rolling-in-2012 (hereinafter “Deals Rolling”).
2. Id.; see also Shira Ovide, M&A Market Barely Above Water for 2011, WSJ BLOGS
(Dec. 6, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/12/06/ma-market-barely-above-water-for-
2011/ (“The M&A market was on a tear in the first half of [2011], with heaps of deals large
and small. Through July, the dollar value of M&A activity worldwide was 16.9% higher than
in the year-earlier period, according to Dealogic. . . . Since then, corporate deal making has
hit turbulence, particularly for big-ticket deals that require large doses of debt financing.
From August through November, the value of deals announced worldwide has slipped nearly
22% from the same stretch of 2010, including a 14.3% decline in November, according to
Dealogic.”) (alteration in original).
3. See supra note 1; see also Stephen F. Arcano et al., Midyear Outlook: Uncertainities
Dampen Deal Activity but Underlying Indicators Provide Bases for Optimism, SKADDEN,
ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FROM LLP, (June 19, 2012), available at www.skadden.com/index
cfm/content ID = site item ID 2792.
4. Ben Casselman & Josh Mitchell, Recovery Doesn’t Feature Typical Snapback in
Growth, WALL ST. J., (Jan. 27, 2012), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970203363504577185313667095068.html.
5. See Deals Rolling, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. VIPAL MONGA, M&A OUTLOOK FOR 2012 IMPROVES, Jan. 9, 2012, available at
http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2012/01/ma-outlook-for-2012-improves/, See supra note 3.
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they are often the source of post-closing disputes. Similarly, buyers have
more leverage to structure buyer-friendly dispute resolution clauses when
deal activity is slow than in more robust times in which sellers have more
options. The deal climate will, accordingly, impact buyers’ and sellers’ abil-
ity to structure any of these provisions in the most advantageous manner.
III. DRAFTING AROUND POST-CLOSING DISPUTES
In the acquisition context, post-closing disputes revolve around three
primary issues: (i) adjustments to the purchase price due to variances in
certain financial metrics; (ii) the amount or availability of an “earn-out”
based on meeting certain financial goals; and (iii) the breach of a represen-
tation or warranty.8 These disputes can include accounting, valuation, and
indemnification claims and can result in damages or adjustments that con-
stitute a material and a significant percentage of the purchase price. Ac-
counting disputes typically relate to the calculation of working capital or
net assets at the closing date, while valuation disputes typically relate to
alleged misrepresentations in the due diligence process that impact the
value of the subject company.9 Indemnification claims vary significantly
depending upon the nature of the transactions.
Parties frequently litigate over the proper forum in which to resolve
such issues, whether one or more of these issues can be consolidated,
whether disputes have been raised in a timely fashion, and whether funds
set aside to deal with a specific type of post-closing dispute can be applied
to another dispute. We have provided an overview of each issue, and the
applicable dispute resolution provision, below.
A. Purchase Price Adjustments
Parties employ a “purchase price adjustment” mechanism in order to
address the possibility that the target company’s performance may differ
from the parties’ expectations between the date of signing and the closing
date.10 Such adjustments typically relate to the difference between a target
company’s “working capital, net assets or net worth” as estimated on a
certain date prior to or as of closing (either the most recent financial state-
ments or “estimated” or “preliminary” financial statements) and as calcu-
lated after closing ( “final” financial statements are sometimes audited ).11
8. ROMAN L. WEIL, MICHAEL J. WAGNER, & PETER B. FRANK, 25 LITIGATION SER-
VICES HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL EXPERT, at 6-13 (4th ed. 2007).
9. Id. at 7.
10. See, e.g., Alyssa A. Grikscheit & Gavin D. Solotar, Key Issues in Drafting and
Negotiating Acquisition Agreements, in DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING CORPORATE AGREE-
MENTS 2012, at 183 (PLI, Course Handbook 2012); see also Roman L. Weil et al supra note 8,
at 3 (discussing postclosing adjustments).
11. See Alyssa A. Grikscheit & Gavin D. Solotar, supra note 10; see also Roman L.
Weil et al., supra note 8, at 3-4.
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1. Identify Financial Metrics
The target amount in a deal involves a negotiation between the parties
and can be a defined amount, a calculation, or the target company’s bal-
ance sheet at a date prior to closing.12 It goes without saying that the par-
ties must be clear as to which financial metrics they intend to include in
any subsequent adjustment, and the basis on which those metrics are to be
measured. The most common purchase price adjustment is based on the
level of working capital (the change in current assets minus current liabili-
ties from those in the preliminary financial statements), but other adjust-
ment mechanisms may involve measuring tax liabilities, shareholders’
equity and net book value.13
2. Identify Accounting Principles
A purchase price adjustment provision must also clearly identify the
accounting principles that are to govern. In a privately-held company, it
may be that the sellers did not keep all accounts according to generally
accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”).14 Accordingly, the parties will
want to be clear about the manner in which the accounting has been han-
dled. One method of addressing this is simply to require that both the
preliminary and final financial statements be prepared according to the
accounting principles consistently applied by the company over a period of
years.15 Of course, this is a recommended qualifier regardless of whether
the accounting is prepared according to GAAP, as GAAP is subject to
interpretation and it is possible for the same account to be recorded differ-
ently and yet still be GAAP-compliant.16
Another method of addressing potential accounting differences is to
include a schedule as an exhibit to the acquisition agreement that de-
scribes the accounting principles applied to the accounts at issue. Such a
schedule can avoid later misunderstandings and may be necessary in order
to ensure that the opening balance sheet is prepared in a manner that is
consistent with the target company’s historical practices.17 If there is a par-
ticular area of the target company’s financial statements that do not meet
12. Roman L. Weil et al., supra note 8, at 3-4.
13. See, e.g., Leigh Walton & Kevin D. Kreb, Purchase Price Adjustments, Earnouts
and Other Purchase Price Provisions, 2005 A.B.A. Sec. Bus. L. 979, *6.
14. See Roman L. Weil et al., supra note 8, at 3.
15. See id. at 7-9.
16. See Leigh Walton & Kevin D. Kreb, supra note 13, at 9-10; see also Roman L. Weil
et al., supra note 8, at 9-10 (explaining GAAP may recognize more than one method as
appropriate).
17. Even the best of intentions can sometimes result in a dispute. We are aware of one
dispute, involving millions of dollars, revolving around whether excess inventory is the same
as obsolete and slow moving inventory. The dispute arose because the addendum to the SPA
fixed the amount of reserves for the OBSOLETE and SLOW MOVING inventory, but did not
mention EXCESS inventory. That agreement was negotiated by the CFO of the seller, a former
audit partner at a Big Four audit firm.
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this standard, it is wise to carve out any specific accounts and discuss the
ramifications with the buyer. For example, if the reserves on inventory and
the related value of the inventory are of concern, the buyer and seller may
agree on the dollar value of inventory to be included in the financial state-
ments prior to closing. The buyer will likely thoroughly inspect the inven-
tory before agreeing to any amount.
Disputes related to the target company’s financial statements may arise
for a number of reasons, with the most common reason being that the
closing financial statements do not comply with the manner in which the
target company consistently has applied GAAP in the past.18 A common
basis for this claim is the use of events that occurred subsequent to the
balance sheet date or closing to refute amounts reflected on the closing
balance sheet. This type of claim frequently involves target management’s
judgment, such as in setting bad debt reserves for accounts receivable and
valuation-related reserves for inventory.19 For example, if the buyer sells
the target’s inventory significantly below the amount reflected on the bal-
ance sheet, the buyer may claim that the inventory reserves were insuffi-
cient and should be increased to an amount that would result in the
inventory balance being consistent with the selling price. The seller may
take the position that the estimate was reasonable and it should not have
to pay for the buyer’s pricing decisions after the close. The buyer may
argue that the seller was motivated to include a lower inventory reserve
than reasonable simply to increase the purchase price.
The application of period-end closing procedures can also give rise to
material difference in account balances. The contractual representation
that the financial statements be prepared consistent with past practice typ-
ically is interpreted to mean the most recent (preferably audited)
financials, such that the normal period-end close procedures are reflected
in the balances. For example, if a target company accrues employee bo-
nuses throughout the year based on expected results and amounts already
earned, the target’s management may not have updated these bonuses to
reflect the most recent company performance and expectations, perhaps
because of a singular focus on the transaction or, perhaps, to show fewer
liabilities. If this accrual is not calculated and updated as of the closing
date, the financial statements could be materially misstated.
3. Identify Who Does What
As a point of negotiation, buyers often want to prepare the preliminary
financial statements as part of their efforts to understand the target’s busi-
ness.20 On the other hand, sellers are wise not to cede control over prepa-
ration of the preliminary financial statements if they want to ensure that
the target company’s accounting principles are consistently applied in the
18. See Roman L. Weil et al., supra note 8, at 8-9.
19. See id. at 10-11.
20. See id. at 13-14.
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preliminary financial statements.21 In order to avoid manipulation by ei-
ther side—either in the process or preparing the preliminary or final finan-
cial statements—the parties may wish to retain an independent accounting
firm to assist in the process of preparation. At the very least, in order to
avoid disputes—particularly in privately held companies in which interim
financial statements may be prepared with less care than final financial
statements—buyers should get comfort that they understand the account-
ing principles that will be implicated in any purchase price adjustment.
4. Identify Valuation Metrics
The failure to properly identify valuation metrics in purchase price ad-
justment provisions also can give rise to disputes. For instance, in Conti-
nental Tire N.A. v. Titan Tire, the parties used a purchase price adjustment
mechanism to cover adjustments in “the market value of the assets trans-
ferred” to the buyer’s pension plan from the seller’s pension plan.22 De-
spite the fact that a purchase price adjustment mechanism was provided
for, a dispute arose over the definition of “market value,” necessitating
litigation.23 Although the court held that the appellant’s arguments over
the market value definition were without merit, it required lengthy litiga-
tion to resolve the dispute because of the lack of good definitions and a
meaningful dispute resolution provision.24
5. Identify Whether the Purchase Price Adjustment
Is Subject to Setoff
In Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. D’Urso Westinghouse, a group of su-
permarkets were sold to a buyer for a purchase price of approximately
$44,000,000.25 The purchase price was paid for in part by an $8,200,000
note and a cash payment of $35,000,000, of which $4,250,000 was set aside
in an escrow to protect the buyer in case it was entitled to a purchase price
adjustment in its favor.26 Over the next several years after closing, the
buyer defaulted on the note, entered bankruptcy, and received an arbitral
award for a purchase price adjustment of approximately $2,300,000.27
During this time, the seller received a judgment of approximately $720,000
against the buyer on a lease issue related to the transaction.28 Westing-
house, a successor-in-interest to the buyer, petitioned the court to compel
the seller to order the escrow agents to release the $2.3 million purchase
21. See id.
22. Continental Tire North America v. Titan Tire Corp., No. WM-09-010, 2010 WL
1223981, at *3-6 (Ohio Ct. App. March 31, 2010).
23. Id. at *2-3
24. Id. at *2-3, 5-6.
25. Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. D’Urso , 278 F.3d 138, 141-42 (2d Cir. 2002).
26. Id. at 142.
27. Id. at 142-143.
28. Id. at 143.
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price adjustment award due to Westinghouse.29 In response, the seller
sought to satisfy and extinguish the purchase price adjustment award by
recoupment of, or setoff against, its judgment on the note and the lease.30
The court found that the escrow provision, as written, only protected
the buyer and held that neither recoupment nor setoff permitted the seller
to satisfy and extinguish the purchase price adjustment award.31 Recoup-
ment was inapplicable because, although the parties’ claims arose from a
single contract, the business was transacted in discrete and independent
units as evidenced by the different forms of security assigned to discrete
parts of the transaction.32 Further, the seller could not set off against the
amount it was due because the right of set off requires mutual debts, “due
to and from the same persons in the same capacity.”33 There was a lack of
mutuality here because Westinghouse asserted its claim in the capacity of
a trust beneficiary while, in contrast, the seller’s claim, which was based on
the remaining balances on the note and the lease judgment, was in the
capacity of an unsecured creditor.34 Perhaps all of this could have been
avoided had the purchase price adjustment provision been clear as to
whether any adjustment was subject to setoff or recoupment.
Each issue will of course be hotly negotiated. Irrespective of diligence
in the drafting and negotiation process, disputes are inevitable due to the
uncertainties and number of variables. Accordingly, the dispute resolution
provision is of critical importance, as will be discussed in further detail
below.
a. Earn-outs
As the credit markets have tightened and the economic climate has
become more uncertain, buyers and sellers have turned to using earn-outs
in an attempt to bridge the gap between the parties’ perception of value,
financing constraints, and risk sharing.35 Earn-outs provide a method of
payment based on the subsequent performance of the business and are
commonly based on a financial metric involving some level of revenue or
29. Id. at 144.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 144, 146-50.
32. Id. at 146-49
33. Id. at 149-50.
34. Id.
35. Maryann A. Waryjas, Negotiating the Acquisition Agreement, in DRAFTING CORPO-
RATE AGREEMENTS 2004, at 509 (PLI, Course Handbook 2004); see also ORION CAPITAL
GROUP, Using Earn-Outs to Bridge the Price Gap Even in Poor Economic Times, http://
www.orioncg.com/newsletters/earnouts_1.php (last visited March 18, 2012) (“Earn-outs tend
to increase in popularity when interest rates increase because buyers can spread payments
over several years.”); C. Dahl & S. Richmond, Earn-Outs: A Worthwhile Tool for
Dealmakers?, MIRIUS’ E-NEWSLETTER, http://www.imakenews.com/rcwmirus/
e_article000148659.cfm (last visited March 18, 2012) (“This is a challenging time for parties
working on M&A transactions, requiring more innovative deal making.”).
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profit, calculated by the buyer and subject to an audit by the seller.36 For
instance, parties may decide that the seller will receive an earn-out when
revenues exceed expenses by a certain amount, or when net revenue (rev-
enue minus expenses) reaches a certain target.
The determination of items to include when calculating revenue and
expenses for purposes of the earn-out, however, can be the source of disa-
greement amongst the parties, particularly when the contract does not
clearly define the accounts that the parties intend to include in calculating
revenue and expenses. In addition, because GAAP is subject to interpre-
tation, the parties should identify specific areas that may be subject to a
wider interpretation and clearly define the manner in which such issues
must be accounted for in a schedule to the contract.37 For example, con-
struction-related revenue and earnings recognition or estimation of war-
ranty expenses each are complex areas of accounting that may be subject
to many interpretations for the same situation.
Earn-outs are tricky. To begin with, buyers and sellers likely will be at
odds over how to ensure that the earn-out milestones are, or can be,
met.38 For instance, if the buyer takes control over the target, the buyer
may be incentivized to make investments immediately after the close, re-
ducing the earn-out, only to reap the rewards of the investment after the
earn-out period expires.39 Another issue for the seller is the buyer’s ability
to maintain the separate books and records of the acquired business. Con-
solidation of accounting departments and operational activities may leave
the parties unable to obtain accurate information upon which to calculate
the earn-out and may make it difficult or impossible for the buyer to main-
tain the target separate from its existing operations so that the parties can
accurately measure the target’s financial performance.40 On the other
hand, if the seller remains in control after the acquisition (in a situation in
which the seller stays on as an officer, for instance) the seller may limit
expenditures to the point of jeopardizing the long-term prospects of the
business in order to maximize the earn-out.41
A buyer may even determine—after making an acquisition—that the
target does not fit the buyer’s long-term strategic plans. However, an earn-
out provision can prevent or inhibit the buyer from divesting the acquired
business. One way to address this issue would be for the seller to require
“an acceleration or modification of the earn-out upon the sale of the
buyer’s business or the disposition of assets or change in the buyer’s busi-
ness that would adversely affect the seller’s chances for obtaining the earn-
out.”42 If the parties could pre-negotiate an agreeable liquidated damages
36. See Roman L. Weil et al., supra note 8, at 11.
37. See id. at 12.
38. See id. at 11-13.
39. See id. at 12-13.
40. See id. at 12.
41. See C. Dahl & S. Richmond, supra note 35.
42. Id.
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sum for an early sale, perhaps the buyer could maintain sufficient flexibil-
ity to sell—providing the economics made sense. Otherwise, buyers must
be vigilant that their post-closing actions not run afoul of implied obliga-
tions of good-faith and fair dealing.43
Further, the parties may even disagree over the determination of
whether the earn-out metrics have been achieved.44 As with a purchase
price adjustment provision, the accounting principles used for measuring
the earn-out milestones will be of critical importance.45 It also is important
for the parties to specify whether the earn-out calculation will take into
account certain elements of revenue or capital expenditures, as the sellers
probably should neither get credit for, nor bear the expense of, the buyer’s
new initiatives.46 Finally, the parties will have different views about how to
calculate the payment amount—whether with a flat amount or a sliding
scale over a certain threshold.47 Once this last issue is negotiated, how-
ever, disputes usually arise over whether the threshold has been met.48
Such issues will have to be negotiated specifically—and parties may
even wish to include a stipulated rider of accounting principles—but expe-
rience suggests that even the most well-negotiated earn-out provision will
give rise to a dispute. As Delaware Vice Chancellor Laster stated in his
decision in Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap: “an earn-out often con-
verts today’s disagreement over price into tomorrow’s litigation over
outcome.”49
b. Representations and Warranties
In an acquisition, parties will make a variety of representations and
warranties.50 Representations and warranties are intended to be confirma-
tory and to allocate risk between the parties.51 They are confirmatory to
the extent they verify the buyer’s understanding of the target company’s
business. They allocate risk to the extent that the seller must indemnify a
buyer—a so-called indemnification agreement—if it turns out, after clos-
43. Sonoran Scanners, Inc. v. Perkinelmer, Inc., 585 F.3d 535, 541 (1st Cir. 2009).
44. See Roman L. Weil et al., supra note 8, at 12-13.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 13.
47. Leigh Walton & Kevin D. Kreb, supra note 13, at 17.
48. Parties will also want to negotiate the length of the earnout period, but this issue is
rarely in dispute post-closing. For a more extensive discussion of the problems that can arise
with an earnout, see Leigh Walton & Kevin D. Kreb, supra note 13, at 16-17, Maryann A.
Waryjas, supra note 35, at 509-512.
49. 984 A.2d 126, 132 (Del. Ch. 2009).
50. Roman L. Weil et al., supra note 8, at 3, 6.
51. Stuart M. Litwin, Drafting Acquisition Agreements, in 913 DRAFTING CORP.
AGREEMENTS 7, 9 (PLI 1996).
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ing, that any of the buyer’s representations or warranties have been
breached.52
A seller can be asked to make a representation and warranty about the
nature and quality of financial statements, the lack of undisclosed liabili-
ties, and about any number of issues about the target’s business.53 There
are two key questions about representations and warranties. The first is
whether the seller has to make absolute warranties about the truthfulness
of its representations or whether the seller can qualify its warranties based
on its actual knowledge.54 A buyer should avoid any such qualification, as
it allows the seller to avoid its indemnification obligation by arguing that
the seller simply was not aware of the issue that falsifies its warranty.
The second key question is whether any breach of warranty allows the
buyer to obtain indemnification or, prior to closing, to walk away from the
transaction.55 In many transactions, parties agree to a “basket” or “de-
ductible” that serves as a threshold for when the buyer can seek indemnifi-
cation or walk away.56 A potential litigation issue can arise if the
representations and warranties are qualified by “materiality” and there is
a deductible. If the acquisition agreement is not precise, a buyer that dis-
covers one or more breached warranties after closing can be faced with
both: (i) a deductible that it must reach before recovering, and (ii) argu-
ments by the seller that no warranty can be the subject of an indemnifica-
tion claim unless it has been independently materially breached. These
issues can be addressed by skilled litigation counsel—but may be better
addressed beforehand in the parties’ acquisition agreement.
When an acquisition agreement includes both a deductible and a mate-
riality provision, litigation counsel for a buyer will have to argue that “ma-
teriality” is somehow qualified. For example, counsel may argue, in the
context of a transaction in which the purchase price is based on the net
worth of the target company, that every dollar adjustment that would have
altered the purchase price would have been “material.” Or, counsel may
argue that every warranty-related misstatement is per se material after the
deductible is met. However, the better course likely would have been to
simply leave the materiality qualifier out of an indemnification provision
when there is a deductible. In other words, buyer’s counsel should argue
that because of reliance on the warranties in setting a purchase price any
post-closing breach of a warranty would result in a dollar-for-dollar recov-
ery to the buyer once the deductible is met, even if any single breach of
52. Id. Of course, the representations and warranties also give the buyer the right to
walk away. See Maryann A. Waryjas, supra note 35, at 518-19, Roman L. Weil et al., supra
note 8, at 3.
53. See Roman L. Weil et al., supra note 8, at 3 (discussing examples of representations
and warranties).
54. Maryann A. Waryjas, supra note 35, at 519, Roman L. Weil et al., supra note 8, at
5.
55. Maryann A. Waryjas, supra note 35, at 519.
56. Id.
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warranty would have an otherwise immaterial impact on the target com-
pany’s overall financial condition.
An additional issue that must be negotiated in indemnification agree-
ments is whether there should be a limitation on liability.57 Seller’s coun-
sel will seek the lowest possible limitation, while buyer’s counsel will want
to keep as much risk with the seller.58 Parties often limit liability both in
terms of the number of years after the transaction closes in which the
seller can be held responsible and the maximum dollar amount of such
potential liability. Parties also frequently seek to ensure that certain issues,
such as liability for unpaid taxes or hazardous environmental conditions,
remain with the seller no matter how high the dollar amount or how long
it takes for them to arise.
Damage claims that arise from breaches of representations and war-
ranties can involve the historical financial statements the buyer relied
upon to determine the purchase price. As a result, the buyer may make a
“benefit-of-the-bargain” claim and allege damages based on the valuation
methodology employed and demand a downward adjustment of the
purchase price. Determining the appropriate purchase price in a transac-
tion is a complex process and typically results in a range of amounts de-
pending upon the valuation approaches and the buyer’s assumptions
regarding future use of the assets. Typically, the buyer builds a valuation
model based on information from the seller, including the seller’s own pro-
jections of the company’s future performance. The buyer uses the valua-
tion from its model to determine a price, or range of prices, it is willing to
pay for the target company.
Market and income approaches to valuation are commonly used to
value the subject company and rely heavily upon the financial statements
provided by the seller. The market approach to valuation is defined in the
International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms as
A general way of determining a value indication of a business, business own-
ership interest, security, or intangible asset by using one or more methods that
compare the subject to similar businesses, business ownership interests, securi-
ties, or intangible assets that have been sold.59
The market approach generally uses a form of a multiple of the purchase
price divided by a financial metric, such as EBITDA or Revenue. The re-
sulting multiple is compared to publicly-traded company multiples that are
deemed similar to the subject company and multiples of competed transac-
tions in the same or similar industry.
The income approach to valuation is defined in the International Glos-
sary of Business Valuation Terms as
57. See Roman L. Weil et al., supra note 8, at 3, 5.
58. Id.
59. International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms, Appendix B, AMERICAN INST.
CPAS (Apr. 23, 2010), available at http://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/forensicandvaluation/
resources/standards/downloadabledocuments/international_glossary_of_bv_terms.pdf.
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A general way of determining a value indication of a business, business own-
ership interest, security, or intangible asset using one or more methods that
convert anticipated economic benefits into a present single amount.60
The income approach generally involves forecasting future cash flows and
discounting them back to the valuation date in order to determine a
purchase price. A typical method of forecasting is to start with the histori-
cal financial results and prepare a cash flow projection for the target busi-
ness as a standalone entity. In addition to the stand-alone forecast, the
buyer adjusts the forecast for anticipated changes as a result of control of
the business as well as anticipated synergies and often prepares multiple
forecasts assuming worst, base, and best cases to develop a range of poten-
tial purchase prices.
When using the market and income approaches discussed, the buyer
relies upon the historical financial results provided by the seller to deter-
mine the purchase price. If these financial statements do not comport with
the representations of the seller it could have a material impact on the
buyer’s purchase price and, accordingly, could give rise to indemnification
claims. Because small financial statement changes can have significant val-
uation impacts (imagine an 8-times multiple being applied to a $100,000
accounting adjustment), parties should also consider clarifying whether
they intend for the seller’s liability for a breach of an accounting warranty
to include the full impact of that breach on the purchase price.
IV. RESOLVING POST-CLOSING DISPUTES
A. General Considerations
Acquisition agreements typically have different dispute resolution
processes for different types of disputes. In fact, some practitioners use a
separate process for purchase price adjustments, earn-outs, and indemnifi-
cation claims. Below, we have set out the typical processes for resolving
such claims, identified many of the issues that arise with such claims, and
have made several suggestions for unifying or otherwise strengthening the
typical boilerplate dispute resolution process.
B. Typical Dispute Resolution Provisions
It is common for an acquisition agreement to specify separate dispute
resolution provisions for the purchase price adjustment process, on the
one hand, and indemnification and earn-out claims, on the other hand.61
Purchase price adjustments are perceived to be narrow disputes that can
be resolved by an “independent accountant,” whereas disputes over earn-
outs and indemnification are perceived to involve a broader range of is-
sues and matters of law that require resolution of disputed facts, applica-
tion of the law, and more. Yet, in litigation, one thing is clear: there is no
such thing as a simple dispute. Clauses that are too narrow or too broad
60. Id.
61. Roman L. Weil et al., supra note 8, at 6.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\1-1\MPE103.txt unknown Seq: 14 31-JUL-12 9:52
74 Michigan Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law [Vol. 1:61
lead to unnecessary and collateral disputes that are anything but stream-
lined. Efficient dispute resolution requires prior planning. Accordingly,
below, we have analyzed: (i) the perils of an overly narrow dispute resolu-
tion clause, and (ii) how to streamline a dispute resolution clause in arbi-
tration or litigation.
C. Narrow Dispute Resolution Provisions Lead to Ancillary Litigation
A “typical” provision for resolving purchase price adjustment disputes
“is to designate a firm of independent accountants to review the closing
date financial statements.”62 After designation, the parties must then con-
sider and address a number of issues. For example, the parties must con-
sider whether they want the independent accountants to review only
disputed provisions, or the entire set of financial statements. In addition,
the parties must specify whether the accountant should resolve disputes
over whether the preliminary, or target, financial statements were pre-
pared in a manner consistent with historical accounting practices. Sellers,
in particular, may want such a provision in order to address errors in the
closing financial statements that are carried over from the opening finan-
cial statements. Without a specific provision to the contrary, such errors
are typically treated as the “consistent application” of earlier period ac-
counting principles and, as a result, outside of the independent account-
ant’s authority to address.
The parties also need to consider whether the accountants will actually
arbitrate disputes—including considering testimony—under a particular
set of rules, or if they simply will apply their expertise to come up with an
appropriate set of financial statements. In many instances, parties use a
standard, narrow purchase price adjustment dispute resolution clause—
leaving many, if not all, of the details to be fleshed out in a subsequent
dispute. A narrow arbitration clause, however, can lead to expensive col-
lateral litigation over a number of issues, as the following cases
demonstrate.
1. Substantive Arbitrability
One of the most noteworthy issues that leads to collateral litigation is
the question of whether the parties have or have not delegated an issue to
the arbitrator. This issue, known as “substantive arbitrability,” is decided
by a court unless the parties have “clearly and unmistakably intended oth-
erwise.”63 By contrast, an arbitrator decides issues of procedural arbi-
trability, which concern whether the parties have complied with the terms
of the arbitration clause.64 Examination of some case law on this issue
62. Maryann A. Waryjas, supra note 35; see also Roman L. Weil et al., supra note 8, at
14.
63. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (quoting AT&T
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
64. Id.
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demonstrates that, at the very least, parties should think through the issues
in advance that they want the independent accountant to be able to
resolve.
A Delaware case, Avnet, Inc. v. H.I.G. Source, Inc., typifies the signifi-
cant, but perhaps unnecessary, collateral litigation spawned by substantive
versus procedural arbitrability questions.65 In Avnet, the parties executed
an acquisition agreement and included in the purchase price adjustment
provision a four-step process to adjust and finalize the purchase price with
specific deadlines for each step.66 The final step in the process provided
that an accounting firm would review and resolve “all matters . . . that
remain in dispute relating to [the final purchase price.].”67
More than a year after the deadline expired, the plaintiff, Avnet, initi-
ated the first step of the purchase price adjustment process by delivering a
Closing Balance Sheet.68 The defendant, HIG Source, objected to the un-
timely submission but proceeded to negotiate.69 After the parties failed to
reach an agreement, Avnet filed a complaint seeking an order compelling
HIG Source to arbitrate pursuant to the arbitration clause in the purchase
price adjustment provision.70 Finding that the issue was one of substantive
arbitrability, the court held that the court itself must decide whether the
dispute was arbitrable because Avnet did not act within the clear time re-
quirements of the purchase price adjustment provision subject to the arbi-
tration clause.71 In other words, where parties enact a specific process that
is subject to arbitration, and one or both parties do not follow that process,
a court and not an arbitrator may end up determining whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate the issue.
Additional Delaware cases, Nash v. Dayton Superior Corp.72 and HDS
Inv. Holding, Inc. v. Home Depot, Inc.,73 provide similar examples of col-
lateral litigation that result from a narrow arbitration clause in a purchase
price adjustment provision. In each case, the respective agreements con-
tained a very specific purchase price adjustment provision coupled with a
narrow arbitration clause applying only to the purchase price provision.74
As in Avnet, a party in each case acted in a manner outside the strictures
of their respective purchase price adjustment provisions, causing litigation
over whether the court or an arbitrator would decide whether the issue
65. No. 5266-VCP, 2010 WL 3787581 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2010).
66. Id. at *2.
67. Id.
68. Id. at *2-3.
69. Id. at *3.
70. Id.
71. Id. at *6-11.
72. 728 A.2d 59 (Del. Ch. 2008).
73. No. 3968-CC, 2008 WL 4606262 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 1998).
74. Nash, 728 A.2d at 60; HDS Inv. Holding, 2008 WL 4606262, at *2-5.
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was arbitrable.75 In each case, the court treated the issue as one of sub-
stantive arbitrability reserved for the court itself to decide.76
Finally, the question of substantive arbitrability can require the parties
to litigate in multiple forums simply to decide whether a court or an arbi-
trator has the power to resolve a dispute. As the Delaware Supreme Court
opined in James & Jackson, LLC v. Willie Gary, LLC, a court should actu-
ally refer the question of substantive arbitrability to the arbitrator “in
those cases where the arbitration clause generally provides for arbitration
of all disputes and also incorporates a set of arbitration rules that em-
power arbitrators to decide arbitrability.”77 Absent precision in drafting,
the question of whether an arbitration clause is sufficiently broad to pro-
vide for arbitration of all disputes, including a dispute about whether a
dispute is arbitrable, can take the parties first to court and then to an arbi-
trator—causing delay and unnecessary expense. Other Delaware prece-
dent suggests that any agreement that refers the parties to either JAMS or
AAA arbitration (the rules of which allow an arbitrator to decide whether
a dispute is within her authority) can require all disputes to be referred to
arbitration, even if the arbitration clause otherwise appears narrow.78 As a
result, parties should consider whether they want an arbitrator to decide
whether disputes between the parties belong in arbitration; if not, the par-
ties should make it clear that the question of substantive arbitrability is to
be decided by a court. A suggestion for parties who prefer arbitration but
do not want all disputes that may ever arise between them to be arbitrated
is to specifically limit the arbitrator’s authority to disputes specifically aris-
ing out of the acquisition agreement.
2. Arbitration, Followed by Litigation
One recent case, Thule AB v. Advanced Accessory Holdings Corp.,
demonstrates the sort of collateral litigation that can erupt absent a single,
unified dispute resolution provision.79 In Thule, a case from the Southern
District of New York, the buyer and seller negotiated a contract contain-
ing a purchase price adjustment provision, a very broad indemnification
provision, and an escrow.80 The indemnification provision and relevant
definitions in the agreement provided that the defendant would indemnify
the plaintiff from essentially all losses that might have arisen from the de-
75. Nash, 728 A.2d at 61, 63-64; HDS Inv. Holding, 2008 WL 4606262, at *8-9.
76. Nash, 728 A.2d at 63-64 (whether new items could be inserted into the closing
balance sheet in an untimely manner under the agreement was not clearly arbitrable); HDS
Inv. Holding, 2008 WL 4606262, at *8-9 (whether an arbitrator could consider a revised clos-
ing statement submitted later than the time allotted in the purchase price adjustment provi-
sion was an issue for the court to decide given that the arbitration provision limited the
arbitrator to resolving disputes regarding the calculation of the “Applicable Amount”).
77. 906 A.2d 76, 80 (Del. 2006).
78. See McLaughlin v. McCann, 942 A.2d 616, 625 (Del. Ch. 2008).
79. No. 09 Civ. 00091(PKC), 2010 WL 1838894, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2010).
80. Id.
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fendant’s failure to perform or fulfill any of its covenants or agreements.81
The parties also created the escrow account to provide indemnity pay-
ments for any of the buyer’s losses arising out of the agreement.82
In the somewhat unique set of facts in Thule, the buyer sought indem-
nity for the seller’s failure to pay a purchase price adjustment award ob-
tained through arbitration, which led to litigation in federal court over
whether any indemnification award could be paid out of the escrow.83 Ul-
timately, the buyer obtained summary judgment on its claim because of
the breadth of the indemnity language in the agreement.84 However, the
arbitration and litigation—involving two large international law firms—
were undoubtedly extensive and costly.
3. Advice to Reduce Collateral Litigation
As Thule demonstrates, rather than streamlining the post-closing dis-
pute resolution process, a limited arbitration clause (or separate dispute
resolution provisions for purchase price adjustments and other claims) in
an acquisition agreement may lead to unnecessary collateral litigation,
costing time and money. Accordingly, we suggest a broad dispute resolu-
tion clause that gives the institution tasked with dispute resolution the au-
thority to decide a sufficient range of issues that would allow it to resolve
any disputes while avoiding collateral litigation.
In particular, we recommend a unified post-closing dispute process, in
which the purchase price adjustment process is connected with all other
post-closing mechanisms, such as any indemnification and escrow provi-
sions. For instance, if, as in Thule, a buyer obtains a purchase price adjust-
ment but is unable to collect it from the seller, it is in the best interests of
all parties that the collection of that award be handled in an efficient man-
ner. Accordingly, we recommend drafting these provisions with reference
to one another, such as by including a specific reference that the failure to
pay a purchase price adjustment is an indemnifiable loss. Additionally, we
recommend having a unified dispute resolution procedure under which
disputes are first referred to a single gatekeeper—an arbitrator, a media-
tor, or a neutral counselor—who has the obligation and authority to ad-
dress any initial issues, refer disputes to the proper forums (whether an
independent accountant or the well-thought-out arbitration or litigation
process described below), and consolidate them as needed.
81. Id.
82. Id. at *3.
83. Id. at *3-4.
84. Id. at *5-12; Thule AB v. Advanced Accessory Holdings Corp., No. 09 Civ.
00091(PKC), 2010 WL 2287012, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2010) (granting the plaintiff’s motion
for reconsideration and summary judgment to the plaintiff).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\1-1\MPE103.txt unknown Seq: 18 31-JUL-12 9:52
78 Michigan Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law [Vol. 1:61
D. Well-Crafted Arbitration or Litigation Provisions Streamline Dispute
Resolution
Often, earn-outs and indemnification claims are covered under the
same dispute resolution clause. In an effort to “streamline” disputes, par-
ties frequently choose to refer all such disputes to arbitration.85 Yet, par-
ties are well-advised to consider whether, in fact, their standard-form
dispute resolution clauses actually expedite the resolution of disputes. Be-
cause any post-closing dispute resolution process is only as “streamlined”
as the parties decide in advance—through even-handed negotiations that
do not take into account the “leverage” either side may believe it has in an
actual dispute—we recommend more carefully tailored dispute resolution
clauses that set actual parameters and boundaries on pre-hearing discov-
ery, briefing, and even the manner in which a trial or arbitration will be
conducted. As the documents and information typically are the property
of the buyer post-closing, including a clause that allows access to the books
and records for the seller may also assist in streamlining discovery issues.
1. The Well-Thought-Out Arbitration Provision
a. Which Arbitration Rules?
Many practitioners reflexively choose arbitration as a dispute resolu-
tion mechanism and, in doing so, specify the Commercial Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), including the
rules on “Expedited Procedures,” while also incorporating the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.86 However, the AAA’s Expedited Procedures
leave the scope and scheduling of pretrial procedures to the advocacy of
the parties. As a result, a litigant motivated to extend the post-closing dis-
pute resolution process can do so by prevailing on the arbitrator to allow
needless discovery. Because the parties will have incorporated the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure into their agreement without limitation, many
arbitrators will feel compelled—in order to effectuate the parties’ intent—
to conduct a longer proceeding than the parties intended when choosing
the “Expedited Procedures.”
Furthermore, there is an inherent ambiguity in blindly incorporating
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure into rules of arbitration that provide,
in Rule 21, for the arbitrator to exercise discretion “consistent with the
expedited nature of arbitration” as to what discovery should be ex-
changed. In our opinion, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should
never be incorporated in the entirety, specifically because (as discussed
above) it creates an ambiguity as to whether the parties intended a truly
“streamlined” procedure or something akin to federal litigation with Rule
26 disclosures, interrogatories, requests to admit, and the like. Rather, we
85. Leigh Walton & Kevin D. Kreb, supra note 13.
86. AM. ARB. ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCE-
DURE, available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_
004103&amp;amp;amp;revision=latestreleased.
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advise parties to incorporate only specific rules that they perceive will as-
sist them in expeditiously resolving a dispute, such as Rule 30(b)(6)’s re-
quirement for a “corporate” deponent.
An alternative option is to use the JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration
Rules and Procedures.87 These include Rules 16.1 and 16.2, which limit
discovery to the exchange of documents (including constraints on docu-
ment requests and e-discovery), one fact witness for each side, expert re-
ports, and depositions. Under the JAMS rules, the single fact witness
becomes more like a Rule 30(b)(6) witness under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure—a witness who is prepared to testify to all issues in the
case, even on issues about which the witness had no percipient knowledge.
While such a procedure puts a burden on the litigators to prepare one key
witness, it has the benefit of shortening discovery—and, potentially, the
arbitration hearing—considerably. These rules also provide for an early,
dispositive motion, which may obviate the final hearing altogether.88
For a buyer, the party bringing the claim, it is not clear that these pro-
visions are necessarily helpful. The buyer has access to the data, the op-
portunity to shape its claims in advance, and ought to have a handle on all
applicable facts, making factual discovery (except into the other side’s de-
fenses, which may or may not be fact-intensive) less necessary. The seller,
on the other hand, may have an incentive to try to disrupt the buyer’s
business integration efforts by promulgating document requests that re-
quire significant effort despite the JAMS rules’ limitations on such re-
quests. Regardless, it is clear that having pre-defined limits on discovery is
preferable to allowing a litigator to argue to an arbitrator who has no prior
familiarity with the target’s business that he or she be allowed extensive
pre-hearing discovery. In our experience, arbitrators will be reluctant to
foreclose a party from obtaining discovery, in the absence of a compelling
indication of the parties’ intent to engage in only narrowly constrained
discovery, as long as the party can present a compelling need for such
discovery.89
Whether choosing the JAMS or AAA rules, parties who seek a stream-
lined dispute resolution proceeding through arbitration are well advised
to: (i) incorporate only selectively, if at all, the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
87. JAMS, COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES, available at http://
www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/#Rule%2016.1 (including Optional Ex-
pedited Arbitration Procedures) (last accessed on January 27, 2012).
88. When either the buyer or seller is a Delaware corporation, the parties also can
elect to mediate and arbitrate before the Delaware Court of Chancery, allowing them to
access some of the most experienced judges in the country for merger & acquisition related
disputes in a more informal, streamlined setting. DEL. CODE tit. 10, §§ 347, 349 (2003).
89. A buyer may wish to use the JAMS Streamlined Arbitration Rules and Proce-
dures, which use a single arbitrator, have no discovery other than the good faith exchange of
documents and data that is “relevant to the dispute or claim” within 14 days of the claim
being filed. The procedure is beneficial to the buyer, as the buyer will be the plaintiff and
already will have a good sense of the documents needed to support its claims and the factual
basis for those claims.
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cedure in order to avoid any ambiguity about their intent; and (ii) pre-
negotiate discovery limits into the acquisition agreement, such as (1) “no
more than three depositions per side absent good cause shown,” (2) “elec-
tronic discovery from no more than three custodians per side absent good
cause shown,” and (3) “the parties are limited to a single, pre-hearing sub-
mission of not more than 15 pages, absent good cause shown.”
b. Baseball Arbitration
Another way to streamline post-closing disputes is to participate in so-
called “baseball arbitration.” In sports arbitration, the parties (typically a
player and a team) each propose a salary and present their cases about
market value to an arbitrator. Ultimately, the arbitrator picks one of the
two salaries as the “more reasonable,” and the team has an opportunity to
pick up or waive the player. In the case of 27-year old Antti Niemi, the
star net-minder behind the Chicago Blackhawks’ 2010 Stanley Cup vic-
tory, an arbitrator sided with Niemi and the Blackhawks waived him im-
mediately.90 In the commercial setting, however, so-called baseball
arbitration (used even in hockey) allows the parties to streamline the dis-
pute resolution process, typically without such seemingly disastrous (for
Chicago Blackhawks fans, anyway) results.
In baseball arbitration conducted in the commercial context, the par-
ties would provide the arbitrator with their respective numbers and the
support for them. Because the parties know that the arbitrator is going to
be deciding on the reasonableness of the overall number, they would be
encouraged to take reasonable positions—something that, in and of itself,
can streamline litigation. In addition, when each party knows the other
party’s “number,” it can make settlement more likely, as the economics
will then stand out above the histrionics of the litigation.
Baseball arbitration can be used for all aspects of post-closing dis-
putes—purchase price adjustment, earn-outs, and indemnification claims.
This does, in some instances, encourage parties to wrap all disputes into
one, in order to have as many grounds as possible to support a presenta-
tion of an overall deal-price reduction or increase to the arbitrator. In
short, baseball arbitration provides another option to deal lawyers looking
for creative ways to streamline post-closing disputes.
c. Setting the Arbitration Panel
Another issue that arises in arbitration is whether to have one or three
arbitrators. A single arbitrator has the benefit of being relatively cost-ef-
fective. The downside, however, is that a single arbitrator may lack the
expertise or perspective to understand complex accounting or industry-
specific arguments. A three arbitrator panel, on the other hand, is expen-
90. See Chris Kuc, Blackhawks Drop Niemi, Sign Goalie Turco, CHICAGO BREAKING
SPORTS (Aug. 2, 2010, 10:58 AM), http://archive.chicagobreakingsports.com/2010/08/
blackhawks-drop-niemi-sign-goalie-turco.html (last accessed on Jan. 1, 2012).
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sive and makes scheduling hearing dates more difficult—often leading to
long delays between hearing dates.
Accordingly, parties should consider including a dispute resolution
provision that allows a single arbitrator the ability to retain one or more
neutral experts. The costs of a neutral expert can be limited to a specific
dollar amount or the costs can be apportioned to the losing party as a
disincentive to taking outrageous positions in litigation. A dispute resolu-
tion provision with a single arbitrator and a neutral expert could be used
to address all post-closing disputes as well. Such a mechanism would pro-
vide the parties with additional efficiency, as only one team of profession-
als would have to get “up to speed” on the target’s accounting principles,
key business drivers, and other factors in order to resolve any disputes
over purchase price adjustments, earn-outs, and indemnification claims.
A three-arbitrator panel, of course, has some advantages. Most nota-
bly, multiple perspectives in the decision room often are better than one
particularly if a case is complex and interpretation of the facts may be
aided by having a multi-disciplined panel (a lawyer, an accountant, and a
businesswoman, for example). In addition, because a tripartite panel typi-
cally includes two party non-neutrals (at least in its inception), it often will
have at least one member who is predisposed to see things your way. If
considering a three-arbitrator panel, parties ought to consider specifying in
the acquisition agreement that each party will pick a single arbitrator and
then have those two “non-neutrals” pick the neutral arbitrator, who
should serve as the panel chairman. Such an approach should also favor
tight deadlines, in which the parties each have five business days to pick
their non-neutrals and the non-neutrals, in turn, have ten days to pick the
neutral arbitrator. Finally, with a three-arbitrator panel, parties should
consider requiring that the chairman be the only one needed to deal with
discovery issues (i.e., all three panelists are not needed until the actual
hearing). Again, such advance planning will result in a far more stream-
lined process as compared to simply identifying a set of arbitration rules.
Ultimately, for simplicity, we suggest that the dispute resolution clause
elect a single arbitrator. The arbitrator should be given authority to retain
one or more neutral experts, depending on the subject or subjects of the
post-closing dispute, and the costs for such experts should either be borne
by the non-prevailing party or be shared by the parties.
d. Third-Party Discovery in Arbitration
Third-party discovery is another issue to consider when drafting a dis-
pute resolution clause. If the parties contemplate needing discovery from
third parties—whether they be true third parties or people that will leave
the target company and no longer be available after closing—consider an
agreement that the parties will cooperate in obtaining needed third-party
discovery. There is a split of authority as to whether the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (“FAA”) authorizes (and whether federal courts can enforce)
subpoenas commanding third parties to appear and testify before an arbi-
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tration panel.91 Given the lack of clear authority on the point, parties
would be well served to include a provision requiring the parties to work
together to procure third-party discovery.
e. Appellate Review of Arbitration
While many people prefer arbitration because it leads to a final, bind-
ing verdict, anyone who has participated in arbitration knows that a final,
binding, and incorrect verdict is unsatisfying. Yet there are few, if any,
options for appellate review of an arbitration award. Under the FAA, a
court may vacate or modify an arbitrator’s award in the narrowest of cir-
cumstances allowed by the FAA.92 Further, “[r]eview of arbitration
awards under the FAA is extremely deferential.”93
The FAA authorizes vacation of an arbitrator’s award in the following
limited circumstances: (1) “the award was procured by corruption, fraud,
or undue means,” (2) “evident partiality or corruption [by] the arbitra-
tors,“ (3) certain specific misconduct, or (4) “where the arbitrators ex-
ceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final,
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”94
Further, an award may be modified where there is: (1) evident material
miscalculation, (2) evident material mistake, (3) an award was made upon
a matter not submitted, or (4) an “award . . . imperfect in matter of form
91. See Alliance Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. Argonaut Private Equity, LLC, 804 F. Supp.
2d 808, 810–11 (N.D. Ill. 2011), for a description of the circuit split. The Sixth and Eighth
Circuits have held that the power to compel pre-hearing discovery from a third party is im-
plicit in the power of an arbitrator to compel production of documents from a third party for
a hearing. See also In re Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 870–71 (8th Cir. 2000); Am.
Fed’n. of Television and Radio Artists, AFL–CIO v. WJBK–TV (New World Communica-
tions of Detroit, Inc.), 164 F.3d 1004, 1009 (6th Cir. 1999). The Second and Third Circuits
have ruled to the contrary. See Life Receivables Trust v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London,
549 F.3d 210, 212 (2d Cir.2008); Hay Group., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404,
408–09 (3d Cir.2004). The Fourth Circuit has read section 7 of the FAA in more or less the
same way as the Third, though it has suggested that an arbitration panel may subpoena a
non-party for prehearing discovery upon a showing of a ‘special need.’ See COMSAT Corp.
v. Nat’l. Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 275–76 (4th Cir.1999). There is no Seventh Circuit author-
ity directly on point. All of these decisions aside, the Court agrees with the Second Circuit
that ‘[a]ny rule there may be against compelling non-parties to participate in discovery can-
not apply to situations . . . in which the non party is ‘summon[ed] in writing . . . to attend
before [the arbitrators] or any of them as a witness and . . . to bring with him . . . [documents]
which may be deemed material as evidence in the case.’” (citing Stolt–Nielsen SA v. Ce-
lanese AG, 430 F.3d 567, 577–78 (2d Cir. 2005)).
92. Hall Street Assoc. LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586-589 (2008); Johnson v.
Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 635 F.3d 401, 416 (9th Cir. 2011); Cat Charter, LLC v.
Schurtenberger, 646 F.3d 836, 842-843 (11th Cir. 2011).
93. Southco, Inc. v. Reell Precision Mfg. Corp., 331 Fed. Appx. 925, 928 (3rd Cir. 2009)
(alteration in original); see Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 352-58
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s Hall Street opinion eliminated all non-statutory grounds
for vacatur under the FAA).
94. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (alteration in original).
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not affecting the merits of the controversy.”95 Notably, it is unclear if
“manifest disregard” of the law by the arbitrator survives the Supreme
Court’s Hall Street opinion as a non-statutory exception for vacatur, as the
Supreme Court specifically avoided deciding the issue in Stolt-Nielson S.A.
v. AnimalFeeds Int. Corp.96 Regardless of whether any non-statutory ba-
ses of vacatur or modification survive Hall Street, an arbitral award is very
difficult to modify or vacate through appellate review.
Yet, there are options for appellate review WITHIN arbitration—by a
new panel of arbitrators. For example, the JAMS rules include an alterna-
tive appellate process.97 An “out” for further review, even if by a panel of
arbitrators, can be more attractive to a buyer than simply losing an indem-
nification claim. Accordingly, we recommend at least discussing the possi-
bility of an alternative appellate procedure with the client or your deal
team. One way to structure this would be for the parties to provide for
appellate review within arbitration as an option, but to require the party
seeking to invoke the appellate procedure to bear the costs of the appel-
late panel as an economic deterrent to invoking the appeal process lightly.
f. Advice for Structuring an Arbitration Provision
If parties prefer arbitration over litigation, we recommend the
following:
• Appointing a single arbitrator with the ability to retain neutral
experts;
• Limiting discovery, absent good cause shown;
• Agreeing to cooperate on third-party discovery;
• Considering baseball arbitration and/or appellate review of the ar-
bitration award.
2. The Well-Thought-Out Litigation Provision
There is a plethora of evidence to support lawyers’ predilection against
litigation—litigation is expensive, time-consuming and often leads to
counter-intuitive results. But, arbitration is not inexpensive, as parties
have to pay both their lawyers and the arbitrators. Arbitration also can
lead to results that are both counter-intuitive and, more importantly, non-
appealable. Trial lawyers all over the country have explored options to
streamline litigation, in order to capture the best of this country’s original
adversary system.
95. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2006).
96. 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768 n.3 (2010) (refusing to decide whether “manifest disregard”
survives Hall Street); see Countrywide Fin. Corp. v. Bundy, 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705, 716-20
(Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2010) (collecting cases and discussing the Federal Circuit Court split
over whether “manifest disregard” survives Hall Street).
97. See JAMS, OPTIONAL ARBITRATION APPEAL PROCEDURES (2003), http://
www.jamsadr.com/rules-optional-appeal-procedure/ (last accessed on Feb. 6, 2012).
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a. Consent to Trial By Magistrate
One option that has been well-publicized is trial by a United States
Magistrate Judge.98 In such cases, a magistrate judge can tailor briefing
and discovery to be (i) streamlined and (ii) focused narrowly on the issues
the magistrate believes need to be addressed. Magistrates also often have
more flexibility to hear matters quickly.99 Parties can obtain a speedy trial
and still preserve the right to appeal, if necessary.100 Ultimately, trial
before a magistrate judge allows a hybrid approach, by combining some
elements of summary judgment with a trial setting that can also benefit the
parties. In the Delaware Court of Chancery (a frequent forum for merger-
related disputes), the parties can elect to a final adjudication by a master, a
position akin to a magistrate judge.101 In our experience, choosing either a
magistrate or master offers a streamlined, efficient method of resolving a
wide variety of disputes before very skilled judges who can hear the par-
ties on an expedited basis—even when disputes arise during the course of
litigation—and provides quick, well-reasoned, relief.
b. Pre-Trial Agreements
Another approach is to agree to litigate a dispute but to include a pre-
trial agreement, perhaps as a rider, with the acquisition agreement. In a
recent series of articles, a United States Magistrate Judge and two senior
trial lawyers have proposed pre-trial agreements as a means of avoiding
the bulk of discovery that is “unnecessary, distracting, and expensive.”102
They recommend involvement by “lead counsel” in discovery, in order to
avoid picayune disputes and ensure that discovery is keenly focused on
adducing evidence needed at trial. In addition, they suggest early suit
agreements that limit the number and length of depositions, agreements to
avoid objections at depositions, and limitations on the custodians from
whom electronically stored information will be produced, among other
things.103
c. Advice for Streamlining Post-Closing Litigation
The above agreements are the types at which an arbitrator helps the
parties arrive early in a case—largely by forcing the parties to articulate
98. The Hon. Morton J. Denlow, Should You Consent to the Magistrate Judge? Abso-
lutely, and Here’s Why, Vol. 37, No. 2 LITIGATION 3 (Winter 2011).
99. See id. at 6 (“Parties who consent to have their case tried before a magistrate judge
will generally be able to receive a firm early trial date.”).
100. See id. at 4 (“An appeal from a judgment by a magistrate judge in a consent case
goes ‘directly to the appropriate United States Court of Appeals . . . in the same manner as
an appeal from any other judgment of a district court.’ 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3).”).
101. See DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 350 (2009).
102. See Stephen D. Susman & Johnny W. Carter, Better Litigating Through Pre-trial
Agreements, Vol. 38, No. 1 LITIGATION, 22 (Fall 2011); see also The Hon. Jeffrey Cole, A
Judge Comments, Vol. 38, No. 1 LITIGATION, 23 (Fall 2011).
103. Stephen D. Susman & Johnny W. Carter, supra note 102, at 23-25.
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their cases in an initial meeting. Surely parties can hash these issues out
themselves, in advance, and set out parameters designed to narrow litiga-
tion. Accordingly, we recommend that, in drafting a dispute resolution
that refers to litigation, the following points be included:
• Consider consent to a trial before a magistrate or master;
• Limit depositions to no more than 2 or 3 per side—including one
“corporate representative;”
• Limit electronic discovery to the extent feasible;
• Require that discovery disputes be resolved between lead trial
counsel, perhaps in a phone call; and
• Agree to voluntarily meet and confer about identifying and agree-
ing to a mutual production schedule for potentially relevant data.
V. CONCLUSION
Parties to an acquisition ought to carefully think through post-closing
dispute provisions. Care should be given to (i) defining the purchase price
adjustment process, (ii) setting out the metrics for an earn-out, (iii) deter-
mining whether or how to qualify circumstances under which the buyer
can receive indemnification and (iv) the circumstances in which parties can
access the escrow account for damages. The parties should also give equal
thought and attention to the process by which disputes over these issues
will be resolved after closing.
In particular, we recommend a unified dispute resolution process, in
which all disputes are referred to a single point of contact, whether it be an
arbitrator, a mediator, or a neutral counsel, for (i) resolution of procedural
issues and disputes and (ii) referral of the dispute or disputes to the proper
forum, including an independent accountant, an arbitrator, or the court
system. We also recommend that the process by which disputes are re-
solved, whether it be arbitration or litigation, be well thought out in
advance.
To the extent that the parties are able, they should agree in advance
that for all post-closing disputes: (i) discovery will be constrained; (ii) data
will be exchanged voluntarily; (iii) the parties will cooperate as necessary
in obtaining third party discovery; and (iv) disputes will be resolved by
lead counsel. Other mechanisms that we recommend are the introduction
of baseball arbitration or an appellate procedure into arbitration and con-
sent to trial by a magistrate judge in ordinary litigation. In short, we rec-
ommend that parties to an acquisition agreement put as much thought into
negotiating their dispute resolution provisions as they do the other terms
of the agreement.
1. Case Study – Mobile Solutions Co.
Overview of the Parties
Seller: Global Telecom, Inc. (“GTI” or “Seller”), a large telecom com-
pany
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Target: Mobile Solutions Co. (“MSI” or the “Company”), a mobile
phone subsidiary of GTI
Buyer: New Age Capital (“NAC” or “Buyer”), a private equity firm
Overview of the Transaction
• Seller provided an offering memorandum containing detailed infor-
mation regarding the history, financial situation, and prospects of
the Company. During the past twelve months, the Company had
sales of $500 million, EBITDA of $100 million and net income of
$50 million.
• Buyer analyzed the memorandum, conducted due diligence, and
made an offer of $500 million—or 5 times the Company’s trailing
twelve months (“TTM”) EBITDA, plus an Earn-Out totaling 5 per-
cent of the Company’s EBITDA during the first three years subse-
quent to Closing.
• Seller accepted the offer and a Purchase and Sale Agreement
(“PSA”) was executed on December 1, 20X1.
• The PSA established a Target Net Working Capital of $150 million
based on the Company’s balance sheet as of September 30, 20X1
and stated that the Estimated Closing Date Net Working Capital
and Final Closing Date Net Working Capital must be prepared in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles
(“GAAP”), consistent with Seller’s past practices as reflected in the
Target Net Working Capital.
• The transaction closed on December 31, 20X1.
• At Closing, Seller calculated the Estimated Closing Date Net
Working Capital amount at $165 million, resulting in a $15 million
increase to the Estimated Purchase Price at Closing (i.e., $165 mil-
lion Estimated Closing Date Net Working Capital less $150 million
Target Net Working Capital); therefore, Buyer paid Seller $515 mil-
lion (i.e., $500 million plus $15 million).
• One month after Closing, Buyer delivered to Seller its calculation
of the Final Closing Date Net Working Capital of $140 million, or
$25 million less than the Estimated Closing Date Net Working Cap-
ital prepared by Seller.
• Two weeks after receiving Buyer’s Final Closing Date Net Working
Capital, Seller notified Buyer of its objection to Buyer’s accounting
of three line items; namely (i) inventory reserves, (ii) accrued war-
ranty expense, and (iii) accrued EPA fine, resulting in a $25 million
dispute.
Overview of the Parties’ Working Capital Dispute
The following table summarizes the differences between the Target Net
Working Capital per the PSA, Seller’s preparation of the Estimated Clos-
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ing Date Net Working Capital, and Buyer’s preparation of the Final Clos-














Accounts receivable 95.0$ 101.0$ 101.0$                   -$            
Inventory, net of reserves 190.0 195.0 190.0 (5.0)
Accounts payable (124.0) (121.0) (121.0) -              
Accrued warranty (11.0) (10.0) (25.0) (15.0)
EPA fine - - (5.0) (5.0)
150.0$ 165.0$ 140.0$                   (25.0)$         
Summary of Working Capital Dispute
The PSA established Dispute Resolution Procedures to resolve the par-
ties’ net working capital dispute through an Accounting Arbitrator.
Overview of Buyer’s Indemnification Claim
Both Buyer and Seller provided each other with certain representa-
tions and warranties in the PSA, including Seller’s representation and war-
ranty that the Target Net Working Capital as well as financial statements
provided in the due diligence process were prepared in accordance with
GAAP, consistently applied. The PSA identified the State Court as the
agreed-upon venue for resolving contractual issues between the parties,
including indemnity claims.
Buyer alleged that Seller breached its GAAP representation and war-
ranty by failing to prepare its Target Date Net Working Capital and the
income statement upon which Buyer based its purchase price in accor-
dance with GAAP. Buyer alleged that Seller’s misrepresentations resulted
in an overstatement of TTM EBITDA of $20 million. Although the PSA
was silent as to how the parties determined the Purchase Price of $500
million, Buyer alleged it was based on five times TTM EBITDA. Accord-
ingly, Buyer notified Seller of its $100 million indemnity claim to reduce
the purchase price from $500 million to $400 million, as summarized in the
table below.
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($millions)





Revenue 500.0$                500.0$               -$             
COGS (365.0) (365.0) -             
Warranty expense (10.0) (25.0) (15.0)
Inventory reserve expense (25.0) (30.0) (5.0)
EBITDA 100.0 80.0 (20.0)
Multiple 5.0 5.0 5.0             
Purchase Price 500.0$                400.0$               (100.0)$      
Summary of Buyer's Indemnity Claim
Overview of Earn-Out Dispute
Litigation to resolve the parties’ working capital dispute and Buyer’s
indemnification claim have continued for more than a year following the
Closing Date. Buyer and Seller had differing calculations of the Com-
pany’s EBITDA for the twelve months ended December 31, 20X2, as sum-
marized in the table below, resulting in a dispute regarding the amount of
the first Earn-Out Payment. The PSA identified the State Court as the
agreed-upon venue for resolving contractual issues between the parties,
including earn-out disputes.
($millions)
TTM results as of 12/31/X2: Seller Buyer Difference
Revenue 550.0$ 550.0$             -$                  
COGS (410.0) (410.0)             -                  
Warranty expense* (10.0) (25.0)               (15.0)
Inventory reserve expense* (25.0) (30.0)               (5.0)
EBITDA 105.0 85.0                 (20.0)
Earn-Out Percentage 5% 5% 5%
Earn-Out Payment 5.3$                 4.3$                 (1.0)$               
Summary of the Parties' Year 1 Earn-Out Dispute 
* Note: These numbers likely would have changed since the Closing Date (i.e., December 
31, 20X1), but for simplicity and consistency, we will assume they stayed the same. 
Discussion of Each Claim
2. Accrued Warranty Expense ($15 million)
Working Capital Dispute – Buyer’s Position
Seller historically estimated its warranty expense accrual at 2% of an-
nual sales. Buyer calculated a warranty expense accrual of 5% based on
the Company’s actual warranty expense incurred during the two months
subsequent to the Closing Date. Buyer alleged that a 5% warranty ex-
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pense accrual should be applied to TTM revenue to establishing the Final
Closing Date Net Working Capital amount in accordance with GAAP.
Buyer alleged that Seller’s historical accrual was understated and, there-
fore, inconsistent with GAAP and the PSA. Buyer’s claim results in a $15
million working capital claim, as summarized in the table below.
($millions)
TTM results as of 12/31/X1: Seller Buyer Difference
Revenue 500.0$ 500.0$        -$             
% of revenue 2% 5%
Warranty expense accrual (10.0)$ (25.0)$        (15.0)$        
Summary of the Parties' Warranty Expese Accrual Dispute
Working Capital Dispute – Seller’s Position
Seller’s position uses a warranty accrual of 2% of sales which is consistent
with past practice and is GAAP-compliant. This 2% reflects the historical
experience of the Company’s warranty expenses over the past 5 years. The
Company has also received an unqualified opinion on its financial state-
ments in each of the past 5 years and 2% of sales was used to calculate
warranty expense in each of these financial statements receiving unquali-
fied opinions.
Buyer’s calculation of warranty only includes two months of data, and
during those two months there was a recall on model BM4022. When war-
ranty expenses relating to this model are removed from Buyer’s calcula-
tion, warranty expense from 8/15/12 to 10/15/12 is 2% of sales. This recall
is an extraordinary item that is infrequent and unusual and does not truly
reflect the actual warranty expense.
Indemnification Claim – Buyer’s Position
In addition to the argument presented above, Buyer’s analysis of the
warranty expense accrual as of the Closing Date implies an overstatement
of TTM EBITDA of $15 million. Buyer alleges the purchase price was
established based on a five times multiple of TTM EBITDA and, there-
fore, that it overpaid Seller by $75 million (i.e., $15 million x 5).
Indemnification Claim – Seller’s Position
In addition to the GAAP-based argument above, from a valuation per-
spective Buyer’s 5% warranty expense accrual is a one-time, unusual item
that will not impact future cash flows into perpetuity. As a result, the dam-
ages should be limited to the dollar amount of the claim and not based on
the valuation multiple. Buyer has already claimed this in the working capi-
tal proceeding and is attempting to recover twice for the same claim.
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Earn-out Calculation – Buyer’s Position
The improper accounting for warranty expense, as stated above, over-
stated Company’s EBITDA by $15M in the year following the purchase
agreement. Buyer does not owe Seller 5% of this overstated EBITDA or
$750,000.
Earn-out Calculation – Seller’s Position
As stated above, the warranty expense is properly stated based upon
historical, normalized results. Therefore, the proper accounting is to re-
serve 2% of sales, not 5%, and Buyer owes Seller and additional $750,000.
3. Inventory Reserves ($5 million)
Working Capital Dispute – Buyer’s Position
When a customer brings in a malfunctioning mobile phone under war-
ranty, it is the Company’s policy to give the customer a refurbished phone,
and then to refurbish the customer’s malfunctioning phone. The Company
has calculated the value of these refurbished phones to be 50% of the cost
of a new phone. According to GAAP inventory needs to be stated at the
lower of cost or market. Buyer discovered that at auctions (which has a
large market for refurbished mobile phones), that sales of refurbished
phones for the models AP5656, GD2512, and RS8857 (the Company’s 3
bestselling mobile phone models) were being sold at 10% of their initial
value. Therefore Seller needs to increase inventory reserves from 50% to
90% of new cost for its AP5656, GD2512, and RS8857 models. This in-
creased reserve equates to a $5M decrease to inventory.
Working Capital Dispute – Seller’s Position
Seller’s presentation of the reserve is consistent with past practice and
GAAP. Seller uses a 50% reserve because this is the value of the phone to
the Company. Seller does not resell the refurbished phones of these mod-
els as these refurbished phones are only given to customers who come in
with warranty claims and, therefore, the value of these phones is the abil-
ity for the Company to service warranties, and Buyer’s analysis of a 90%
reserve is incorrect.
Buyer also assumes that this auction data is a market for mobile
phones. GAAP states that the principal market (the market with the
greatest volume for the asset) should be used when measuring fair value,
and if there is no principal market, then the most advantageous market
(the market with the best price for the asset) be used. Buyer’s auction data
is neither the principal market nor the most advantageous market for the 3
disputed models of mobile phones.
Indemnity Claim – Buyer’s Position
In addition to the argument presented above, Seller’s understatement
of inventory reserves resulted in an understatement of COGS and an over-
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statement of the TTM EBITDA by $5M causing Buyer to overpay for the
Company by $25M.
Indemnity Claim – Seller’s Position
Based on the same arguments in the working capital proceeding, a
50% reserve is appropriate. Therefore, the COGS and the TTM EBITDA
are stated in accordance with GAAP consistently applied with past
practice.
Earn-out Claim – Buyer’s Position
The improper accounting for warranty expense, as stated above, over-
stated Company’s EBITDA by $5M in the year following the purchase
agreement. Buyer does not owe Seller 5% of this overstated EBITDA or
$250,000.
Earn-out Claim – Seller’s Position
Based on the same arguments in the working capital proceeding, the
accounting for inventory reserves prepared by Seller above is consistent
with GAAP consistently applied with past practice.
4. EPA Fine ($5 million)
Working Capital Dispute – Buyer’s Position
Buyer asserts that Seller failed to disclose and accrue the $5M EPA
fine. The information that was known or knowable to the Seller at the
time of the closing date of the balance sheet was sufficient that under
GAAP the fine should have been accrued. In other words, although the
$5M fine was probable and could be reasonably estimated, Seller did not
accrue the fine.
Working Capital Dispute – Seller’s Position
The Company had never been audited by the EPA or any other similar
organization and the audit was ongoing. The amount of the fine was not
known or knowable at the time of the transaction and the Company could
not have reasonably estimated the amount of the fine. The Company
properly disclosed the EPA audit in the financial statements according to
GAAP.
Case Study Observations
The purpose of this case study is to demonstrate how the same issues
and arguments can result in three separate proceedings resulting in costly
and protracted disputes. In addition, it is possible for the results of the
proceedings to overlap, creating a potentially inequitable overall result.
For example, if the Buyer wins the inventory reserve argument in both the
working capital and indemnity claims, is there an element of double recov-
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ery? Due to the possibility of conflicting decisions from the different ve-
nues, the timing of each of the proceedings must be orchestrated so as to
minimize conflicts and inconsistencies.
The case study illustrates how well-thought-out drafting of the dispute
resolution clauses in the PSA can minimize the costs associated with
resolving what is essentially the same dispute in multiple venues. The par-
ties may want to consider consolidating all disputes into a single venue, as
discussed above.
